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I.INTRODUCTION
The common law is the best and most common birth-right that
the subject hath for the safeguard and defence, not only of his
goods, lands and revenues, but of his wife and children, his
body, fame and life also. 1
The common law remains one of the most important legacies we Americans
received from our shared history and roots with England, and a birthright our
citizens share with those of the United Kingdom. Not only did the common law
serve as the model for our own jurisprudence, but generations of American
lawyers, including many of our founding fathers, early presidents, and most
eminent early jurists, were trained on Lord Coke's Commentary on Littleton and
Report/ and understood and embraced Lord Coke's admonition to let not cases
be committed:
"to slippery memory, which seldom yieldeth a certain reckoning.
In troth, reading, hearing, conference, meditation, and
recordation are necessary.")
So it is with more than a little interest - and concern - that many of us on this
side of the Atlantic are following the civil justice reform and alternative dispute
resolution (AD.R.) movement in England. The proffered motivations - court
congestion, delay, cost, and the like - are the same ones that launched our own
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I Sir Edward Coke, quoted in Catherine Drinker-Bowen, The Lion and the Throne: the Life
and Times of Sir Edward Coke (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1957) at p.509.
2 Catherine Drinker-Bowen, ibid at pp.513-514 [hereafter BOWEN).
3 Sir Edward Coke, ibid at p.506.
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civil justice refonn and AD.R. movement in the 1970s. The resulting changes,
however, have exacted a heavy toll on the American legal system and quality of
justice, particularly by eroding our common law foundation in favour of the
privatization of commercial dispute resolution. .
The common law, and how it develops principles for allocating risk and
deciding business and commercial disputes through a body of reported public
decisions, has provided a framework for governing commercial trade and
commerce that many countries have adopted today.4 Scholars from Harvard
University and the University of Chicago even credit the common law as a
reason why certain countries develop at a more advanced rate than others.5 The
common law, with its tradition of stability and predictability, is often cited as an
important factor why companies are attracted to particular countries and states
to do business.6 But perhaps the common law's most salient feature and key to
its creative genius has been its acceptance of change and evolution, that "the
common law could not stand still - it must be developed to respond to the
demands of justice in a living society"? by the creative development of legal
principles derived from "judges of the past searching the casebooks for just
4 See Ray August, International Business Law (Prentice Hall, 2nd ed., 1997), at pA2 (map
depicting the distribution of the world's legal systems).
5 See "The Law of the Market" The Economist, (19th April, 1997) at p.78. See also, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, Law and rlnance, National Bureau of Economic
Research, N.B.E.R. Working Paper 5661 (July, 1996) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer & Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, National Bureau of Economic
Research, N.B.E.R. Working Paper 5879 (January, 1997) (on file with the authors).
6 See Robert Stewart, Bermuda: An Economy Which Works (Island Press Ltd, 1997)
(pointing out that one of the major reasons why international companies are attracted
to Bermuda is its English common law system and the objective, public deCisions
rendered by the British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council). Further, Donald
Conlon and Daniel Sullivan note that a key reason why many companies incorporate
in the state of Delaware is because of its:
"200 plus years of case law. In its breadth and depth, this body of law goes
further than similar bodies of law in other states toward meeting corporate
needs for certainty and predictability. Organization theorists have long
recognized the importance of reducing uncertainty by controlling or
managing elements of the external environment, such as the legal
environment "(citations omitted)
in Donald E. Conlon & Daniel P. Sullivan, "Examining the Actions of Organizations in
Conflict: Evidence from the Delaware Court of Chancery" Acad. of Mgmt. 1., June, 1999, at
p.320.
7 Robert Goff, "Lord Denning - A Memoir" [1999] Denning L. 1. xxiii at p.xxv.
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solutions to new problems.,,8 This genius is well illustrated by the contribution
of the common law to the rapidly changing field of intellectual property:
"[T]he common law has emerged as a source of protection for
intellectual property rights throughout this century whenever
statutory protection for new forms of media were still evolving.
This phenomenon results from the relationship between
communication technologies, which are dynamic and often
difficult to anticipate, and statutes, which traditionally have been
adopted only in reaction to such changes ... [I]n cases in which
statutory protection may not readily apply to new technologies,
intellectual property owners have repeatedly and successfully
resorted to common law theories for legal solutions to new
problems.,,9
However, notwithstanding the common law's undeniable contributions to and
facilitation of trade and commerce, the common law as a jurisprudential system
for developing commercial precedent in the United States is under siege by a
purported reform movement bent on implementing "managerial justice" by
largely privatizing business and commercial dispute resolution. Privatization is
accomplished through a variety of procedural tools including private and
judicially mandated A.D.R., vacatur, selective publication, depu,blication, filings
under seal, confidential settlements, and even the arrival of corporate
megafirms. The resulting irony is that as commercial dispute resolution is
increasingly privatized, the growth and development of the very body of law
which has traditionally served business and commerce so well is being stunted,
if not stopped.
We explain below how and why we believe the development of a
contemporary body of commercial law in the United States is being thwarted
and distorted through these various privatization processes in the earnest hope
that highlighting these mistaken policies will assist U.K. and primarily English
readers in apprising their own civil justice reform initiatives and in ensuring that
those reforms do not result in throwing the common law "baby" out with the
bath water.
8 The Hon. Justice Michael Kirby AC. C.M.G., "Lord Denning and Judicial Activism"
[1999] Denning L. 1. 127 at p.145.
9 Bruce P. Keller, "Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of
Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual
Property Rights" 11Harv. 1. L. & Tech. 401 at p.403 (1997).
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II.THE ROLE OF THE COMMON LAW IN AMERICAN BUSINESS DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
A foundational principle of the American body politic is that citizens and
businesses are provided with access to legal and political processes, and that
these processes are subject to public scrutiny. However, the widespread
privatization of business dispute resolution limits the very development of such
a system. Further, it distorts the development of a contemporary body of
commercial law. Before courts are allowed or encouraged to become even more
removed from such processes, it is helpful to revisit the critical role that the
common law system of precedent plays in the development and growth of
commercial law .
(a) Precedent Defined
Precedent is:
"an adjudged case or decision of a court, considered as
furnishing an example or authority for an identical case
afterwards arising or a similar question oflaw.,,10
Precedent is implemented by the doctrine of stare decisis -- the protocol
that courts should follow precedent in deciding cases and which has
been in place for centuries, II and remains "the everyday working rule of
our law.,,12 In American law schools, through the use of the case
method, students are taught how to identify and use precedent.
Moreover, this training and process does not end upon graduation from
law school. Young litigators soon learn that judges -- at least the good
ones -- do, in fact, "exam and compare" precedent,13 and that the
modification and development of precedent depends upon a change in
the holdings of individual courts about specific disputes. 14 When this
process is properly implemented and followed, the body of commercial
law does indeed:
10 Black's Law Dictionary 1176 (6th ed. 1990).
11 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries 1.62-63.
12 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press, 1921) at
p.20
13 Ibid
14 Ibid at pp.23-25.
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"stand as a monument slowly raised, like a coral reef, from the
minute accretions of past individuals, of whom each built upon
the relics which his predecessors left, and in his tum left a
foundation upon which his successors might work.,,15
(b) Precedent -- Why is it Used by Courts?
Courts use precedent for a variety of reasons. For example, prior judicial
decisions serve as the "public record of the 'unwritten law,' customs and legal
traditions, acquiring both their meaning and authority from recognition as part
of the collective wisdom or reason.,,16 Under this view:
"precedent helps establish a smooth transition between the
accumulated experience of the past, evidenced by judicial
decisions, and the present, to which the reasoning of the prior
decision is applied, unless the present court determines that the
. , . .' ,,17prIor court s reasomng was In error.
Courts also use precedent not because it represents society's collective
wisdom or reasoning, but because of the very authority of the judiciary. 18Under
this view, the judiciary, as the sovereign, has the authority and right to establish
a legal framework by which rules can be known, legal consequences can be
predicted, and public expectations can thereby be protected. 19
(c) How Do Courts Use Precedent in Business Cases?
Courts use precedent in business cases in a variety of ways. First, they look to
precedent to help resolve the dispute at hand?O Professor Melvin Eisenberg
writes:
"Complex societies characteristically need an institution that can
conclusively resolve disputes deriving from a claim of right
based on the application, meaning, and implications of the '.
15 Learned Hand, "Review of Judge Cardozo's The Nature of the Judicial Process" 35 Harv.
L. Rev. 479 at p.479 (1922).
16 Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A. Leben, "Restoring the Common in the Law: A Proposal for
the Elimination of Rules Prohibiting the Citation of Unpublished Decisions in Kansas and the
Tenth Circuit" 31 Washburn. L. J 155 at p.170 (1992).
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (Harvard Univiversity Press,
1988) at p.4.
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society's existing standards. In our society that institution is the
courts, and the resolution of such disputes is accordingly a
central function of our courts. This centrality is manifested in a
variety of ways. To begin with, courts in our society are
structured to be fundamentally passive. Unlike a legislature, a
court may not properly initiate action on its own motion but may
act only when set in motion by a party with a claim.
Correspondingly, a court is limited to action that is responsive to
the claim made. The kinds of claims the court may properly act
upon are also limited. The claim normally must be contested -
that is, the subject of a dispute. The claimant nonnally must
assert that the respondent has either infringed (or threatens to
infringe) upon his rights, or is otheIWise at fault in a manner that
sufficiently involves the claimant's interest to render it
appropriate for him to make a claim whose disposition turns on
that fault. The claim must be based on a standard that relates to
[business norms] rather than, say, on an artistic standard. The
standard on which the claim is based must rise to a certain level
of significance, in tenns of either the seriousness of the injury
that typically results from its violation or the importance of the
nonn or policy that it reflects. ,,21
Second, courts use precedent to further enrich the supply of legal rules that
govern business disputes?2 Eisenberg further writes:
"Our society has an enormous demand for legal rules that actors
can live, plan, and settle by. The legislature cannot adequately
satisfy this demand. The capacity of the legislature to generate
legal rules is limited, and much of that capacity must be
allocated to the production of rules concerning governmental
matterg, such as spending, taxes, and administration; rules that
are regarded as beyond the courts' competence, such as the
definition of crimes; and rules that are best administered by a
bureaucratic machinery, such as the principles for setting the
rates charged by regulated industries. Furthermore, legislatures
are normally not staffed in a manner that would enable them to
21 Ibid
22 Ibid
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perfonn comprehensively the function of establishing law to
govern action in the private sector.'.23
Thus, the following question arises: are today's courts in the United States
being utilized to their fullest potential in developing and refining our body of
contemporary commercial law? As discussed below, the answer is,
unfortunately, no. But before we tum to this question in detail, we first address
the important point of how business cases in the United States have changed
over the years and how those changes have challenged our courts' ability to
efficiently resolve such disputes.
III. THE CHANGING NATURE OF BUSINESS CASES
Our society has changed over the years, as has the nature of our business
transactions and resulting business disputes that our courts are being asked to
resolve.
(a) Secondary Rights and Increased Case Complexity
In recent years in the United States, there has been a proliferation of
"secondary" or redundant rights in many types of business cases. This has in
tum significantly increased the complexity of many business disputes. By way
of example, consider the following.
Years ago a licensor who licensed a patent to a licensee and then discovered
that the licensee was misusing the patent was likely to allege that the right that
had been violated was the licensing agreement (i.e., it was breached). Today,
that same case will see a plethora of secondary rights come into play based on
contract law, federal patent law, and unfair competition law. Specifically, as in
the past the licensor's complaint will allege a cause of action for breach of the
licensing agreement. But it will also allege a cause of action for infringement --
in part to attempt to obtain the benefit oftreble damages versus standard breach
of contract damages. Also, the licensee will bring its own counterclaim for
unfair' competition-antitrust violations.
Similarly, twenty years ago a dispute between a law finn and its client over
fees, to the extent that unpaid fees were even pursued, normally consisted of the
law firm filing a complaint for breach of contract with the client in tum filing an
answer that alleged a few straightforward affirmative defenses. Discovery in the
case was clean and simple, as were the legal issues. Today, that same dispute
results in the client not only filing an answer, but a counterclaim for
23 Ibid at pp.4-5.
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professional negligence (usually for leverage purposes), and the cost and
complexity of the case are thereby significantly increased.
In summary, these secondary rights often transform what used to be a
relatively straightforward business case for the court to decide into the exact
. 24opposIte.
(b) Increased Internationalization
Not only has there been a proliferation of secondary rights and case complexity,
but in recent years we have witnessed the emergence and development of a truly
global economy 25 The United States is no longer a country in which local
manufacturers use local materials and labour to create a product for sale only in
a local market. Instead, many products are made for a national or even
international market. It is not uncommon for manufacturers to:
"obtain raw materials or parts in one country, perform
subassembly in another country, [with] final assembly
[occurring] in yet another, then deliver [the] products 'just in
time' to customers in several countries.,,26
This phenomenon has presented difficult and complex choice of forum, choice
of law, discovery, and judgment enforcement issues for our courts, especially
our state courts who are often unfamiliar with such issues.27
(c) Increased Speed
Many of today's business transactions and markets, especially in an era of
electronic commerce, move faster than ever before. Take Web entrepreneurs as
an example. In the past such entrepreneurs did not normally think in terms of
the patentability of their business ideas and inventions.28 Yet the market is now
forcing them to do so, and they are discovering that it can take eighteen months
just for a patent to be issued,29 let alone litigate any related ownership dispute in
24 See also, Jeffrey W. Stempel, "A More Complex Look at Complexity" 40 Ariz. L. Rev.
781 (1998) ("[I]t seems fair to conclude that there has been major growth ... of complex
cases."[at p.819]).
25 See Schaffer, Earle & Agusti, International Business Law and its Environment (3'd ed.,
West Publishing) at pp.4-6.
26 Byron Acohido, "Expansion Express--Airlines, Air-Freight Companies Enter High Stakes
Arena of Global Delivery" Seattle Times, (3'd June, 1990), at E 1.
27 See, e.g.. Schaffer, Earle & Augusti, supra n.25 at pp.1 05-130.
28 See Wendy R Leibowitz, "La""Yers and Technology: Patents and E-Business" NAT'L L.1.,
(14th June, 1999) at A19.
29 Ibid.
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the courts. By the time such litigation is resolved, the cyber-market place will
have changed several times over, thereby often making the end-result of the
litigation irrelevant. 30
In short, courts sometimes find it difficult to keep up with a market-place that
demands expedited resolutions.3!
IV.THE FLIGHT OF BUSINESSES CASES TO PRIVATE A.D.R.
Based on business behaviour itself, it appears that voluntary resort to private
AD.R. is an increasingly frequent impediment to fully developing and refining
our body of contemporary commercial law: for the past several decades
businesses have been increasingly fleeing to private AD.R. to resolve their
disputes.32
The decision by parties to a dispute to submit their dispute to A.D.R., whether
by a previously negotiated AD.R. clause in a contract or an agreement to
submit to AD.R. when the dispute arises, is generally a private and elective
decision but nevertheless results in the diversion and unavailability of that
dispute from a public resolution. Indeed, the national policy favouring
arbitration is so strong that the United States Supreme Court has concluded that
Congress intended in passing the Federal Arbitration Act to withdraw the power
of the States to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
30 Ibid.
31 To speed up business dispute resolution, many American courts have implemented "rocket
dockets" or "fast-track" systems. See, e.g., Carrie E. Johnson, "Rocket Dockets: Reducing
Delay in Federal Civil Litigation" 85 Cal. L. Rev. 225 (1997). However, the efficacy and
~uality of these systems is questionable ibid at pp.238-254.
3 In the early 1980s several Fortune 500 companies founded the Center for Public Resources
("C.P.R") Institute for Dispute Resolution to explore private dispute resolution as an
alternative to litigation when involved in a dispute with each other. A "C.P.R Pledge" was
created in which member companies promised to explore A.D.R. before litigating with each
other. c.P.R. obtained SO signatories to that Pledge in 1983. By mid-1999, that number had
grown to 4,000. See <http://www.cpradr.orglcorppldg.htm>. Recent surveys also confirm an
increase in the use of private A.D.R by American business. For example, a 1994 survey
conducted by Arthur Anderson LLP General Counsel and Corporate Legal Times found that
fiftypercent of those surveyed had used A.D.R within the last year - a seventy-five percent
increase in A.D.R use over the prior year. See "News From Around the States: Survey
Shows Increase in Corporate ADR Use" 6 World Arb. & Med. Rep. 145 at p. 145 (1995)
Private A.D.R. providers also report a significant increase in business. For example, the total
number of private arbitrations and mediations handled through the American Arbitration
Association ("A.A.A.") alone has nearly doubled in the past decade, to a projected 90,000 in
1998. See Carolyn Kleiner, "The Action Out of Court" U S. News & World Report, 29th
March, 1999 at p.90.
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contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.33 The consequences of the
removal of these cases has consequences for the parties and public alike. For
example, "arbitrators ... are not necessarily bound by earlier decisions of other
arbitrators in the same case,,34 nor does an arbitration award have any collateral
estoppel effect in favour of non-parties to an arbitration. 35
In this section, we discuss some ofthe primary reasons for this flight to
private A.D.R. in the United States, and, more importantly, why many of these
reasons may be based more on misconception than fact.
(a) Perceived Court Congestion and Delay
For those who advocate an increased role for A.D.R. in resolving business
disputes, the point is often made that the courts are congested, rife with delay
and inaccessible due to a "litigation explosion." One commentator has noted
that with the:
"excessive delays and exploding caseloads of the civil courts,
many disputants view traditional litigation as unable to meet
their conflict resolution needs. More and more parties are turning
away from the judicial system and are resorting to private
dispute resolution firms. ,,36
The cause of this so-called litigation explosion has been tlle subject of intense
debate in the United States. Some proffered reasons include the growing
diversity and size of the American population; a heightened level of
litigiousness among Americans; an increase in the number of judicially and
statutorily created rights and a broadening of the definition of the class of
people entitled to enforce those rights; expanded discovery; excessive law-
making; an increase in crime and criminal prosecutions (especially drug-related
offences); and so on. But what is interesting to note is that to the extent that
such an explosion has occurred, there is no evidence that suggests that it has
33 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1; 79 LEd. 2d 1; 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984)
(reversing a California Supreme Court case (Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584; 183
Cal. Rptr. 360; 645 P.2d 1192 (1982) which had found that the state legislature had intended
claims under the California Franchise Investment Act (Corporations Code §§ 3100 et seq.) to
be limited to judicial enforcement).
34 Broughton v. ClGNA Health Plans of California, 21 Cal. 4th 1066 at 1081; 90 Cal. Rptr.
2d 334; 988 P.2d 67, 77 (1999).
35 Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.4th 815 at 836-37; 982 P2d 229 at 242 (1999).
36 Lucille M. Ponte, "Putting Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Back On the Docket:
Recommendations on the Exercise of Judicial Authority" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 at p.1069
(1995).
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been disproportionately fueled by business cases. Further, some commentators
(and even some prominent judges) point out that the claim of a "litigation
explosion" is vastly exaggerated,37 if not outright false.38 Finally, many business
executives and their corporate counsel are discovering that private AD.R. does
not always live up to its billing in this regard, and if anything, often results in
. d I 39excessIve e ay.
(b) Expense
Private AD.R. is often touted as being cheaper than traditionallitigation.40
There is also evidence that suggests that business executives and their in-house
counsel at least perceive that the traditional court system is too expensive.41
However, due to a lack of empirical data, it is unclear whether A.D.R. is, in fact,
cheaper than traditionallitigation42 Some commentators contend that it is not,43
37 Some exaggeration is no doubt the result of the falloul of the long-standing political duel
between the plaintiffs' bar and the insurance defense industry: the trial attorneys in many
states have been able to block insurance-funded tort reform efforts but the insurance industry
has countered by raising the spectre of third party claims, frivolous lawsuits, and litigation
gridlock which has resulted in procedural changes which favour their interests. See, e.g., in
the British context, Robert C. Meder & Stephen 1. Vickers, "The Woolf Reforms" Risk
Management, (Sept. 1999) at pp.32-40.
38 See. e.g., Marc Galanter, "Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote" 55 Md. L. Rev.
1093 at pp.l102-09 (1996); Jack B. Weinstein, "After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?" 137 U Pa. L. Rev. 1902 at
f.' 1909 (1989)
9 See, e.g., Harold Brown, "Alternative Dispute Resolution Realities and Remedies" 30
Suffolk U L. Rev. 743 at pp.767-768 (1997); Jeffrey G Kichaven, "ADR Does Not Save
Time or Money? Great Newsl" Di!>p.Resol. Mag., (Summer 1997) at p.15.
40 E.g., The C.P.R. Institute for Dispute Resolution claims that for a fIve-year period ending
in 1995,652 companies using C.PR panelists reported a total cost savings of over $200
million, with an average cost savings of more than $300,000 per company. See
<http://www.cpradr.org/poll_597.htm> .
41 See John Lande, "Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers and
Executives Opinions" 3 Harv. Neg. L. Rev. I at pp.35-36 (1998)
42 See. e.g., Richard E. Reuben, "The Dark Side of ADR" Cal. Law, (February, 1994) at
p.54 ("For all the promised benefits of ADR, independent statistics documenting them are
almost nonexistent. One reason is the secrecy of the proceedings; few records exist for
researchers to examine."); Editorial, "Mandatory ADR: Can We Talk?" 78 Judicature (May-
June, 1995) at p.272 (noting the lack of empirical support for many AD.R. claims).
43 See e.g.. Reuben, ibid (citing an arbitration that produced a $15,000 award and $6,000 in
attorneys fees but was more than offset by a $30,000 legal bill and $9,000 for the arbitrator's
services, and how, had the case stayed in the public system and gone to trial, the parties
would not have had to even pay for the judge); James 1. Alfini, "Summary Jury Trials in State
and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Lawyers" 4
Ohio St. J on Disp. Resol. 213 at pp.229-231 (1989) (study in which a majority of the federal
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and as Marc Galanter notes, critics of the cost aspect of litigation often ignore
the benefits:
"[S]ociety's accounts should reflect not only the costs but the
benefits of enforcing such transfers, which afford vindication,
induce investments in safety, and deter undesirable behavior. For
instance, the sums transferred by successful patent infringement
litigation not only are not lost, but maintain the credibility of the
patent system that in tum has powerful incentive effects. To put
forward estimates of gross costs - even ones that are not make-
believe - as a sufficient grade to policy displays indifference to
the vital functions that the law performs. ,,44
(c) Perceived Juror Ignorance and Bias Against Business
Another reason why businesses in the United States may be increasingly turning
to private A.D.R. is because they believe that juries do a poor job determining
liability and assessing damages in lawsuits against businesses and they judge
businesses more harshly than individuals.45 The following statement from a
business executive is typical:
"Is it any surprise that many commercial contracts these days
have a clause where each party waives its right to a trial by jury?
Doesn't that tell you something? That they are not willing to
trust 12 peers off the street with the complexity of their business
transaction "" and that doesn't mean that people are stupid. It
means that businesses have become very complex in many
respects. The nature of their product offerings, not necessarily
how the business is run, but the nature of the products. Open up
the insides of a laptop computer and try to have some jury decide
whether or not there has been a patent infringement on the
design of a microchip. I certainly wouldn't be capable of doing
thcrt46
lawyers asserted that their billable hours increased when the A.D.R. mechanism of a
summary jury trial was used)
44 •Galanter, supra n.38 at p.!!42.
45 See Lande, supra n.4! at pp33-34.
46 Ibid at p.34.
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Yet, the research of several prominent scholars strongly suggests that if
anything, the contrary is true and that juries do know what they are doing and
do give businesses the benefit of the doubt.47
(d) Perceived Lack of bxpertise in the Judges Presiding Over Business Disputes
Another oft-touted benefit of many forms of private A.D.R. is the ability to
select a "dispute resolver" with "expertise" in the business issue at hand. Judges
in the traditional court system, on the other hand, are so'metimes perceived to
lack such expertise,48 especially by business executives.49 To the extent that a
lack of such expertise exists, the politicization of judicial selections5o and even
their salaries51 may contribute to the problem. Yet the lack of expertise is by no
means unique to judges in the traditional court system. If anything, businesses
are finding that it may be even more acute with respect to many purported
"A 0 R'I' ,,52. . . specla 1StS.
(e) Privacy and Confidentiality
With private A.D.R., the parties can obtain a large measure of privacy and
confidentiality. Often being a private proceeding, A.D.R. allows businesses to
resolve their disputes without creating a public record. 53 For a business
47 Valerie P. Hans & William F. Lofquist, "Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in
Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate" 26 L. & Soc y Rev. 85
(1992); Valerie P Hans, "The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business
Litigation" 79 Judicature 242 (1996); Galanter, supra n.38 at p.1109.
48 Peter Zeughauser notes:
"[W]hat sober minded business person wants an important dispute decided
by. a former D.A. who was appointed to the bench because of his or her
skill in locking people away for crimes that were more often than not self-
evident?"
Peter D. Zeughauser, "What's in a Name? Plenty" Am. Law., (April, 1996) at pp.44.
49 Lande, supra n.41 at pp.32, 34-35.
50 For an interesting historical discussion on the selection offederal judges in the United
States and the politicization of the process, see Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges:
Lower Court Selection From Roosevelt Through Reagan (Vale Univ. Press, 1997). For the
same regarding President Bush's and President Clinton's appointees, see Sheldon Goldman,
"Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint" 76 Judicature 287 (1993) and Sheldon Goldman
& Elliot Slotnick, "Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire" 82
Judicature 265 (May-June, 1999).
51 See William C. Smith, "Bailing From the Bench" A.B.A. J., (May, 1999) at p.22
(discussing how the disparity between law firm salaries and judicial salaries is driving
experienced judges from the bench).
52 See Harold Brown, supra n.39 at pp.758 & 760.
B See generally, William H. Schroder, Jr., "Private ADR May Offer Increased
Confidentiality" Nat 'I L. J, (25th July, 1994) at CI4-16.
19
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
concerned about eroding public confidence in its product or services, any
proceedin~ that allows it to resolve its disputes out of the public eye is
attractive. 4 Similarly, AD.R. is often attractive to a businesses concerned about
being forced to reveal one or more of its trade secrets during litigation. 55
Businesses may also seek to avoid creating a legal precedent that may later
prove to be disadvantageous to them or their industry, and are thereby drawn to
any AD.R. process in which the likelihood of a successful appeal is small. 56
However, many businesses are discovering that the touted privacy and
confidentiality of private AD.R. is by no means a sure thing and can be
problematic. For example, with respect to mediation, judges that have ordered a
case to mediation often request a status report from the mediator in order to
determine who is bargaining in good faith and who is foot-dragging. 57In other
cases, criminal prosecutors may call the third party neutral to testify.58 There are
also situations in which a company's decision to seek refuge in the privacy of
AD.R. backfires. Consider a large;:corporation who has been sued by multiple
customers. Assume that the company believes that all of the cases are without
merit, but agrees to mediation, and for economic, publicity, or risk
considerations agrees to pay ten cents on the dollar to settle the first ten cases.
When mediating the eleventh case, the company may, as part of its strategy,
wish to use this data to its advantage and as evidence of what the case is
"worth. " Yet, and depending upon the confidential settlement terms that were
reached and agreed to during the first ten mediations, the company and its
counsel may have failed to think things through and inadvertently waived the
ability to utilise such information in the eleventh case 59
(f) The Advertised Ability of A.D.R. to Provide "Win-Win" Business Solutions
and Preserve Business Relationships
Yet another touted advantage of private A.D.R. is its ability to offer "win-win"
solutions in a business dispute that courts cannot provide. AD.R. is often
54 See Judith Resnik, "Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline" 53 U Chi. L. Rev.
494 at p.538 (1986).
5S See Tom Arnold, "A Better Mousetrap: ADR" Vol. XXX No.1, Les Nouve/les,(March
1995) at p.34.
S6 See Brown, supra n.39 at p.764 (discussing the common standards for reviewing and
challenging an arbitrator's legal and factual findings in the United States - "manifest
disregard of the law," "arbitrary and capricious," and "completely irrational" - and how these
standards are very difficult to satisfy.).
57 See Michael Higgins, "In the Spirit of Mediation" A.B.A. 1., (March. 1998) at pp.94-95.
58 Ibid.
59 One of the authors was involved in a recent mediation that posed a similar issue for the
opposing party and its corporate counsel.
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viewed as being less hostile than traditional litigation, thereby allowing
businesses to better preserve ongoing relationships.6o Yet these claimed benefits
are often overly simplistic, presumptuous, and even misleading. There is
nothing that prevents an attorney in traditional litigation from exploring and
implementing "win-win" solutions. In fact, a well-trained attorney does so and
skillfully uses the tools and leverage of the court system to attain that goal as
quickly as possible for his or her client.61 Moreover, some commentators
persuasively argue that many disputes involve such important issues that they
should be litigated, and that the "feel-good" results of AD.R. are often inferior
to those obtained in traditionallitigation.62
V.CHANGES IN How COURTS SERVICE BUSINESS DISPUTES
While there is disagreement in the United States about whether a "litigation
explosion" has occurred, there is little doubt that many people perceive that one
has occurred. How has the American judiciary attempted to cope with this
perceived increase in its workload? Primarily through the following tools:
managerial judging; a process labeled "self-bureaucratization:" forcing business
cases into some form of AD.R. (often against their will); and fmally, the
increased use of vacatur, selective publication, depublication, filings under seal
and confidential settlements. Thus, and as shown below, for the business cases
that do opt to enter into the traditional court system and avoid private AD.R.,
these tools amount to yet another level andform of privatization, thereby
further distorting and thwarting the growth of our body of commercial law .
(a) Managerial Judging
Judith Resnik has written about what she calls "managerial judging" - where
judges become involved in the pretrial management of the case to try and
relieve perceived court congestion (e.g., ruling On discovery disputes, deciding
joinder issues, conducting pretrial conferences, settlement conferences, and the
60 dArnol , supra n,55 at pp,33-34,
61 The following is a common example in traditional American litigation: One party sends
out a series of document requests, deposition notices and interrogatories with a settlement
offer. The settlement offer is timed to expire shortly before the discovery is due, This
strategy can and often does serve as an effective impetus to get the parties to sit down,
communicate, and resolve the case,
62 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, "Against Settlement" 93 Yale L J 1073 (1984); Marc Galanter &
Mia Cahill, " 'Most Cases Settle': Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements" 46
Stan. L Rev, 1339 (1994),
21
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
like).63 This type of judging poses several dangers. First, a deeper involvement
by judges in the pretrial phase of the case may compromise their independence
and prematurely cause them to favor one side or position in the dispute, which
will in tum impact the quality of their deliberations. Second, and even more
importantly for the purposes of this article, managerial judging undercuts the
obligation and requirement that judges act in public and formally record and
document the reasons behind what they do (or do not do).
The following is an example: in the past a young attorney in the United States
who wanted to learn how a particular judge handled pretrial matters (e.g.,
discovery motions) used to be able to walk over to the courthouse and spend the
morning sitting in the gallery of the judge's courtroom and observe the judge
rule on various law and motion matters. But this is becoming more and more
difficult to accomplish. Today, it is not uncommon for the case to be called, the
parties' counselled into the judge's private chambers (or more likely a
conference room), sit down and discuss the case with the judge (or more likely a
discovery referee or judge pro tern), no court reporter is present, and the matter
is argued and decided. This same routine is then repeated for every case on the
calendar. Relatedly, and perhaps even more disturbingly, today's courts and
judges in America are often evaluated not for the quality of their decisions (e.g.,
how often they are appealed and reversed), but for their ability to move cases
along and clear the docket.64 While the impact of this management philosophy
on the development of our contemporary body of commercial law is difficult to
measure, we submit that it is more deleterious than beneficial.
(b) Judicial Bureaucratization
The United States has also witnessed an increase in the size of the judiciary, its
support staff (e.g., magistrates, special masters, judge pro terns, discovery
referees, law clerks, staff attorneys, and the like), as well as judges' reliance on
those staff.65 Some refer to this development as the "bureaucratization of the
judiciary. ,,66 When judges delegate responsibility for initially assessing or
deciding portions of a case to someone else in the courthouse, they diminish
63 See Judith Resnik, "Managerial Judges" 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376 (1982); Resnik, "Failing
Faith" supra n.54.
64 E.g., the California Judicial Council publishes time-on-the-docket statistics for some of its
courts. See Judicial Council of California, Report on Court Statistics (1997) at p.17. These
statistics inevitably become ammunition in various political and public policy battles.
65 See Owen M. Fiss, "The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary" 92 Yale L. 1. 1442 at pp.1442-
1468 (1983); Joseph Vining, The Authoritarian and the Authoritative (University of Chicago
Press, 1986), at pp.51-57; and Alvin B. Rubin, "Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The
Tension Between Justice and Efficiency" 55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 648 at p.650 (1980).
66 Fiss, ibid; Vining, ibid; & Rubin, ibid at pp.648-659.
22
UNCOMMON LAW
their own level of personal responsibility for their decisions, which in tum leads
to greater anonymity in judging. This results in the impression that these
decisions have not been rendered or written by an individual with an identity of
their own, but are instead the product of an impersonal institution. The
downside of such impersonalization is that it gives businesses yet another
reason to flee the court system for private A.D.R., thereby further distorting the
growth of our commercial precedent.
(c) Courts Forcing Business Cases Into A.D.R. Against Their Will
It is not just a case of businesses seeking to avoid the traditional court system.
Even our own courts have made the conscious policy decision to divert business
cases into A.D.R. in order to conserve judicial resources.67 Thus, for the
business that does opt into the court system and have its "day in court," it is
likely to find itself entangled in the very form of dispute resolution - A.D.R. --
that it sought to avoid from the beginning.68 It is therefore ironic that even
though business tax dollars help pay for the American court system, courts have
sent the message that such judicial welfare is reserved for other types of cases;
namely, criminal cases, family law cases, civil rights cases, and the like. Again,
while the impact of this diversion process on our contemporary body of
commercial law is difficult to measure, we submit that it is more harmful than
beneficial.
67 While court use and promotion of A.D.R. was not unheard of prior to the 1970s, the 1976
Pound Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Courts (co-sponsored by
Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the American
Bar Association) was the first major push in the United States to consider alternative ways to
inexpensively and more efficiently obtain justice in the courts. Since the Pound Conference,
the use of A.D.R. by courts took off and has only accelerated. See, e.g., Patrick Fn'Piere &
Linda Work, "On the Growth and Development of Dispute Resolution" 81 Ky. L. 1. 959 at
Pf.962-963 (1993).
6 See Stephen P. Younger, "Effective Representation of Corporate Clients in Mediation" 59
Alb. L. Rev. 951 at pp.951-52 (1995) ("With increasing frequency, our courts are encouraging
litigants to use [A.D.R.] procedures .. to clear up overburdened court calendars.");
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, "Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law" 74
Wash. U. L. Q. 47 at pp.48-49 (1996) ("Within the last fifteen years, in both state and federal
courts, litigants have often been required to attend [an A.D.R.] session before they will be
allowed to be heard by a judge."); Ibid at p.52 ("As [A.D.R.] programs are institutionalized
'" litigants find themselves directed off their original course of seeking justice through
law.").
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(d) Vacatur, Selective Publication and No-Citation Rules, Depublication,
Filings Under Seal and Confidential Settlements
Yet another tool that the courts in the United States have implemented to
address the perceived workload problem has been to make (or allow) the
increased use of vacatur, selective publication and the adoption of no-citation
rules, depublication, filings under seal and confidential settlements. As shown
below, each of these tools is a form of privatization that further subtracts from
our body of commercial law .
I.Vacatur
One development that has recently been the subject of robust debate is the
increasing use of vacatur, where, after a trial court reaches a decision and issues
a judgment, the parties reach a private settlement rather than pursue further
appeals. As a condition of their settlement, the parties request the appellate
court to vacate the lower court's prior judgment.69 Vacatur, however, not only
erodes the public's confidence in the COurtS,70but it prevents the use of
judgments for collateral estoppel purposes, diminishes the stare decisis value of
judgments, and most importantly, alters the shape and development of our
business and commercial precedent. 71
2. Selective Publication and No-Citation Rules
The decision by many court systems to selectively publish certain decisions is
yet another form of privatization. 72This decision by appellate courts was largely
69 A detailed discussion and analysis of vacatur is beyond the scope of this article. But for a
good discussion on vacatur, its history, usage rate, advantages and disadvantages, scope, and
the debate surrounding its use, see Howard Slavitt, "Selling the Integrity of the System of
Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur" 30 Harv. CL. -- CL. L. Rev.
109 (1995); Judith Resnik, "Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for
Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century" 41 UCL.A.
L. Rev. 1471 (1994); and Stephen R. Barnett, "Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication
and Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme Court" 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1033 (1993).
70 In Neary v. Regents of the University Of California, Justice Joyce Kennard of the
California Supreme Court wrote that "Public respect for the courts is eroded when this court
decides that a party who has litigated and lost in the trial court can, by paying a sum of
money sufficient to secure settlement conditioned on reversal, purchase the nullification of
the adverse judgement." Neary, 3 Cal. 4th 273 at 287; 834 P.2d 119 at 127; 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d
859 at p.867.
71 Slavitt, supra n.69 at pp.133-134.
72 Again, a detailed discussion and analysis of selective publication is beyond the scope of
this article. But for a good discussion of selective publication, its history, usage rate,
advantages and disadvantages, scope, and the debate surrounding its use, see Slavitt, supra
n.69; Gerald F. Uelmen, "Publication and Depublication of California Court of Appeal
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motivated by work flow and shelf-space concerns regarding the burgeoning
quantity of case decisions.73 But as with vacatur, selective publication has
resulted in a significant loss of available contemporary cases to use as a guide in
resolving similar disputes.74 One commentator notes:
"Selective publication suppresses precedent that would help
courts decide future cases. In addition, even if selective
publication saves time, it distorts the shape of precedent.
Lawyers use precedent to evaluate how courts apply the law
across a broad range of cases as much to identify what a precise
rule of law is. One cost of saving time, then, is that it leaves the
law unclear and may ultimately lead to more litigation to clarify
the law. The long-term costs of distortion, therefore, may
outweigh any short-term efficiency of savings ... By making the
law more certain, it also allows individuals to structure their
affairs to avoid disputes and litigation.,,75
An additional concern that has been raised with respect to selective
publication is that a court, knowing that it is not going to certify a case to be
published, may not devote the same amount of energy to its decision.76 The
Opinions: Is the Eraser Mightier than the Pencil?" 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1007 (1993); William
L Reynolds & William M. Richmond, "The Non-Precedential Precedent - Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Court of Appeals" 78 Colurn. L. Rev.,
1167 (1978). See also the web site Nonpublication.com at info@www.Nonpublication.com.
73 See generally, Siavitt, supra n.69 at p.123; and Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., "The No-Citation
Rule for Unpublished Opinions Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts
JustifY the Means of Secrecy?" 50 s.c. L. Rev. 235 at pp.243 & 249 (1998).
74 See Hinderks & Leben, supra n.16 at p.158 (noting that over 60 percent offederal circuit
court decisions are not published); and Gerald F. Uelmen, "Losing Steam" Cal. Law., (June,
1990) at pA3; and Philip L. Dubois, "The Negative Side of Judicial Decision Making:
Depublication as a Tool of Judicial Power and Administration on State Courts of a Last
Resort" 33 ViII. L. Rev. 469 at pA88 (1988) (collectively pointing out that less than fifteen
percent of appellate decisions in California are even certified for publication and of that
fifteen percent, the California Supreme Court orders an additional ten percent depublished).
Since these articles were published the number of California Courts of Appeal decisions
marked by California appellate judges who author them as "not to be published in the Official
Reports" under Rule 976 of California Code of Civil Procedure has risen to 93 per cent I See
California Bar Journal (July, 2000) at p.9.
75 Siavitt, supra n.69 at pp.126 & 140.
76 See Carpenter, supra n.73 at p.251 (noting that "[I]fjudges know that their
opinions are not citable and that they will not have to sign the opinions, the same
'quality control' pressures will not be in place."). For a cogent critique and criticism
of this short cut by judges, see Anthony Kronman The Lost Lawyer (Harvard
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selective publication problem is further aggravated by its usual companion, the
no-citation rule.77 However, if unpublished opinions are to be treated in a
manner consistent with the common law model, then they should be citable and
used as binding authority.78
3.Depublication
Many higher appellate courts are now depublishing certain decisions because
they disagree with a lower court of appeal over a portion of its reasoning.79 As
with vacatur and selective publication, depublication is form of privatization
that has resulted in a loss of available contemporary cases to use as a guide in
resolving similar disputes. For example, in California, the California Supreme
Court depublishes more appellate opinions each year than it publishes opinions
of its own.80 Further, only seven percent of all appellate decisions in California
are even certified for publication.8l
4.Filings Under Seal and Confidential Settlements
In the United States most pretrial activity is not accessible to the public.82 This
is certainly true with respect to most pretrial discovery. 83Yet, in spite of this
University Press, 1995) at pp.330-331. Dean Kronman argues that opinion writing
disciplines the imagination and if a judge determines that an opinion "won't write,"
then that means his or her logic or reasoning is flawed and that he or she needs to go
back and rethink the matter.
77 Carpenter, supra n.73 at p.236. No-citation rules are just what the name implies -- they
~rohibit the citation to unpublished opinions.
8 Carpenter, ibid at p.240.
79 As with vacatur and selective publication, a detailed discussion and analysis of
depublication is beyond the scope of this article. But for a good discussion of depublication,
its history, usage rate, advantages and disadvantages, scope, and the debate surrounding its
use, see Slavitt, supra n.69; Uelmen, supra n.72; Barnett, supra n.69; Dubois, supra n.74;
and Joseph R. Grodin, "The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court" 72 Cal.
L. Rev. 514 (1984).
80 Uelmen, supra n.74 at pp.34 & 43-44.
81 See Uelmen and Dubois, supra n.74. Related to the vacatur, selective publication and no-
citation rules, and depublication problem is the increased issuance of appellate decisions
"without comment" and the decreased use of oral argument in appellate cases, both of which
distort precedent. See, e.g., William C. Smith, "Big Objections to Brief Decisions" A.B.A. J,
(August, 1999) at p.36 (noting that last year the federal appeals courts disposed of 25,020
appeals on the merits, about sixpercent of which were disposed of "without comment,"
meaning the court did not expound the law as applied in the case or did not explain the
reasons for the ruling); and Carpenter, supra n.73 at p.255 n.55 (noting the "increasingly
frequent cases where the court hears no oral argument and issues an unpublished opinion
based solely on the briefs").
82 See Resnik, supra n.69 at p.493 n.84.
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fact, there is a "growing tendency" throughout the courts, "especially in
commercial cases, for litigants to agree to seal documents produced during the
discovery process as well as pleadings and exhibits filed with the court" and to
keep settlements confidential.84 This tactic, however, not only eliminates
precedent, but also precludes third parties from obtaining such infonnation85
and imposes substantial costs on future litigants who may not know of the
underlying wrong86 Or, even if these other litigants are aware of the wrong,
they must proceed to conduct expensive discovery to prove once again that a
d 87wrong occurre .
VI. CORPORATE MEGAFIRMS FURTHER THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS AND
UNDERCUT THE GROWTH OF THE COMMON LAW
We have highlighted how in order for commercial precedent to develop and
grow, business cases must enter (and remain in) the court system, they must be
tried and their records kept public, verdicts must be rendered, appeals pursued,
and appellate opinions published. Popular perception would have us believe that
today's lawyers in the United States are trying cases and putting that process in
motion. However, this perception is not the reality for the vast majority of
today's litigators. Most cases are resolved by negotiated settlements.88
Traditional litigation in the fonn of a trial and appeal is the exception.89 Kevin
McMunigal states it perfectly:
"The last two decades have seen a population explosion in the
legal profession, and much of the new manpower is employed
exclusively in work related to lawsuits. These lawyers are
usually not trial lawyers. They are called "litigators." Few of
83 See Resnik, ibid at p.1493 n.85.
84 Nault's Auto. Sales, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co, 148 F.R.D. 25; 43 (D.N.H. 1993).
85 See, e.g., Ralph Nader & Wesley 1. Smith, No Contest (Random House, Inc. 1996). Nader
and Smith remind us that "information is power" and that "in order for people to make
informed decisions about how they will conduct their lives, about which products to purchase
and which to avoid, about which companies to patronize, and the like, they need access to
information." at p.61
86 Ibid at pp.60-75.
87 Ihid
88 See Kevin C. McMunigal, "The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of
Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers" 37 U C.I.A. L. Rev. 833 at pp.838-839 nn. 15 & 17-19
(1990) (and the authorities cited therein).
89 Ibid See also, Kleiner, supra n.32 at p.90 ("Just a fraction oflegal matters are ultimately
resolved in court")
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them have had jury experience, and if they participate in a bench
trial it would be as a "second chair" to a trial lawyer. It is
important to understand that the litigator is not simply a young
lawyer acquiring experience that will equip him to start trying
cases. Litigators are now a separate specialty. There are many
50-year old litigators whose trial experience has been negligible.
They are highly regarded in their specialty and conduct seminars
attended by those who wish to improve their own skills as
litigators. And they are in charge of training the new generation
of litigators. ,,90
He goes on to add:
"[Unlike the discovery lawyer] [t]he experienced trial lawyer
understands the ultimate end of the discovery process. He knows
that everything he does is directed to the single goal of
convincing the judge or jury. When the experienced trial lawyer
prepares a case, he never loses sight of the fact that he is
structuring the case for trial. In a sense, he is constantly asking
what do I need for trial? How can I get it quickly? ...
All too often the discovery lawyer with little trial experience is
uncertain and lacks direction. This is particularly so in large
cases where the lawyer who prepared the case not only will not
try it but may only be familiar with one small aspect of the case.
In such a case the discovery tends to lack direction because the
lawyer does not know where he is going or why he's doing
certain things. More depositions are taken than needed.
Witnesses are deposed who are not needed and who should not
have been deposed at all. Objections and evasions are frequent
because the discovery lawyer just isn't sure how the senior man
will try the case and doesn't want to be criticized for not
protecting the client.
The lawyer's lack of trial experience causes him anxiety and
uncertainty. Because he is not confident all too often the
tendency is to try to insure that absolutely nothing is left
uncovered. The discovery goes on interminably as every
conceivable stone is turned. The unfortunate result is misused
90 McMunigal, supra n.88 at p.840.
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discovery, overdiscovery, expensive discovery, and at times,
h ful d· ,,91ann Iscovery.
What is the reason for the advent of the "discovery lawyer?" Some proffered
reasons include the procedural opportunities created by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; the staffing needs of large-scale litigation; the simultaneous
decline in trial rates with an increase in the number of lawy'ers, and so on. We
suggest an alternative reason: large corporate law finns, their current structure
and organization, and their corresponding failure to properly train and mentor
their junior attorneys for trial work. 92
By way of background, in 1991, forty-seven percent of all lawyers in private
practice in the United States were in finns of twenty-one or more lawyers,
including thirty-three percent in finns of fifty-one or more lawyers.93 Today this
figure is undoubtedly higher. 94 This is not to say that the influence of smaller
law finns and solo practitioners on our body of commercial law is insignificant.
But the reality is, large corporate law finns handle the majority of legal work for
most (if not all) major u.s. companies, and they exercise power and influence
well beyond their numerical strength.95
In the past, the mentoring and training of junior lawyers to become skilled
trial attorneys was an important part of the institutional structure of these
finns.96 But today, that is no longer the case. Despite their claims to the
contrary, they have become driven by the "bottom line.',97 The effective
mentoring and training of their junior attorneys is no longer a priority.98
91 Ibid at p.870.
92 For an excellent discussion on the arrival, growth and transformation of the large corporate
law firm in America, see Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The
Transformation of the Big Law Firm (University of Chicago Press, 1991); and Kronman,
supra n.76 at pp.271-314.
93 Barbara A. Curran & Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report: The u.s. Legal
Profession in the 1990s (American Bar Foundation, 1994), at p.8.
94 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, "Legal Education and Entry Into the Legal
Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt" 70 NYU. L. Rev. 829 at p.839
(1995) (noting that in the practice oflaw "there [has been] a marked shift to practice in larger
settings").
95 For an excellent elaboration of this point, see Kronman, supra n.76 at pp.272-273.
96 For an excellent example, see Patrick J. Schiltz, "Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law
Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney" 82Minn. L.
Rev. 705 at pp.720-722 (1998).
97 See John J. Curtin, Jr., "Civil Matters" A.B.A. J., (August, 1991) at p.8 ("The law is edging
ever closer to being a business rather than a profession, a development which emphasizes the
bottom line above all other concerns"); Galanter & Palay, supra n.92 at pp2-3 ("[Although]
laments about commercialization and the loss of professional virtue have recurred regularly
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This development has manifested itself in a variety of ways, each of which
has contributed to (and continues to contribute to) the advent of a generation of
discovery lawyers who do not know how to try a business case. For example,
the compensation of partners in these firms (and decisions about who makes
partner) focus almost exclusively on the business and revenue that the partner
generates.99 The partner who brings in business and is able to keep as many
associates as possible busy in his or her practice group can expect to be
handsomely rewarded by the firm. The partner who takes a daily hands-on
approach to the legal work of a business client and uses that process to train and
mentor the firm's junior lawyers is unlikely to fare as well. 100 The impact ofthis
management philosophy and institutional structure on mentoring and training is
obvious. Second, the associates in these firms are under tremendous pressure to
bill hours1ol and at the same time bring in new business. 102 They are also
expected to hit the ground running to justify their high starting salaries. 103 There
is, quite simply, no time for junior attorneys to be mentored and trained in a
personal, deliberative and thoughtful way. Third, the increased lateral
movement of attorneys has caused many corporate law firms to view junior
attorneys as "dispensable worker bees" rather than someone they should invest
in and train to become quality trial lawyers. 104 Finally, in an intensely
competitive legal environment, many corporate law firms will not hesitate to try
for a century '" there is something different this time around. The present 'crisis' is the real
thing .... " (footnote omitted).
98 Schiltz, supra n.96 at pp.739-746. In the March, 1989 issue of the California Lawyer, it
was reported that many California firms are using outside consultants for training in trial
skills. See Paul D. Freeman, "Teach the Associates Well" Cal. Law., (March. 1989) at p.77.
However, McMunigal suggests that while the articulated reason for using such consultants is
"efficiency," an alternative explanation may be that even the partners in loday's law firms
lack the necessary trial skills to provide such training. McMunigal, supra n.88 at p852 n.82.
99 See, e.g., Galanter & Palay, supra n.92 at pp.52-53.
100 In working for and litigating against large corporate law firms, the authors have seen
many such examples. Interestingly, there are even cold, calculating mathematical formulae
that such firms use to measure profitability and performance. See, e.g., Altman Weil, Inc.'s (a
global consulting firm to the legal profession) web page at:
<http://www.altmanweil.com/publications/articles/ economic _financial_management/ efm3a.h
tm>
101 Schlitz, supra n.96 at pp.739-740. See also, Terry Carter, "Superstars or Falling Stars?"
A.B.A. 1., (August, 1998) at p.28 (putting the current billable hour "gold standard" at
corporate law firms at 2,400 hours per year). As McMunigal notes, such an institutional
structure "may create pressures for lawyers to file meritless cases to generate hourly fee work
in discovery and motion practice." McMunigal, supra n.86 at p.864.
102 Schlitz, supra n.96 at p.741.
103 Ibidatp.743.
104 Ibid at p.744.
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and lure clients away from competing finns lOS -- time that a lawyer spends
courting a competitor's client decreases the number of hours in a day available
for providing or receiving mentoring and training.
Unfortunately, this focus and institutional structure distorts our system of
commercial precedent. Among other things, the discovery lawyers that these
finns grow and produce undoubtedly increase litigation expense which in turn
likely causes some businesses to flee the public court system and turn to private
A.D.R. to resolve their disputes. Further, because many discovery lawyers lack
confidence in their trial skills, they may consciously (or subconsciously) seek
out private A.D.R. in order to minimize their own stress or embarrassment. 106
For the few discovery lawyers that do actually end up trying a business case, it
is not uncommon to see a polluted trial court record subsequently presented to
the court of appeal, 107 thereby perhaps.leaving an appellate court with no choice
but to use the privatization tools of selective publication and depublication.
VII. ADDITIONAL DANGERS POSED BY THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS
Any mechanism that privatizes the resolution of business disputes distorts our
system of precedent and will have a significant impact on the business
community. But we submit that the American business community, those
governing and advising it, and even the judiciary has not honestly, intelligently,
and fairly evaluated and weighed the benefits of this privatization process
against the harms. In addition to stunting the growth of commercial precedent,
the following are some additional dangers to consider.
(a) The Loss of Information and Reduction of the Public Intent
As earlier noted, one of the attractive features of private A.D.R. is that certain
things can remain private and confidential. However, this results in a significant
amount of infonnation that is difficult to track and lost to the public. Further, to
the extent that public disclosures are made during the privatization process,
105 Ibid at p.741.
106 McMunigal, supra n.88 at p.873 (1990). Relatedly, McMunigal makes the point out that
when the number of civil trials declines, litigators' advocacy skills atrophy. This degeneration
process in turn distorts not only the trial skills of litigators, but also the settlement process. In
other words, litigators without adequate trial experience are less able to accurately evaluate
cases and are more likely to settle out offear of their own inadequacy. Ibid at pp.855-862.
107 See Burger, "Some Further Reflections on the Adequacy of Trial Counsel" 49 Fordham
L. Rev. 1 at p.1 (1980) ("a broad consensus has now emerged that a significant problem
concerning the quality of a substantial number of]awyers' performance in the trial courts
does indeed exist."); Rubin, supra n.65 at p.649 ("Today appeals involve records of
thousands of pages and briefs and arguing dozens of issues.")
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they are often not tracked, memorialized and stored. 108 There is already a
scarcity of data and infonnation available to scholars who study private A.D.R.
and the court system. 109 The privatization of business disputes only adds an
additional layer of fog that makes the meaningful study and analysis of such
issues all the more difficult.
Further, if we are serious and sincere about protecting the public intent, much
of the infonnation that is nonnally hidden by private A.D.R. should be made
available to the public. Consider, for example, the American company,
Whirlpool Corporation. Several years ago Whirlpool entered into an agreement
with State Fann Fire and Casualty Company that "established a process for
resolving State Fann's subrogation claims against Whirlpool arising out of
products sold by Whirlpool which allegedly caused property damage to State
Fann's insureds."IIO Whirlpool and State Farm agreed to remove all disputes
from the public court system and resolve their disputes pursuant to mediation
and arbitration. III The companies streamlined discovery rules and eliminated
outside lawyers from the process. 112 The proceedings and all decisions are kept
confidential, and thereby inaccessible to the plaintiff's bar.ll3
This arrangement is undoubtedly of great value and benefit to Whirlpool and
State Fann. Yet there are compelling reasons why such agreements violate
public policy and such infonnation should be revealed. In a typical products
liability lawsuit, for example, the negative effects of a product may not yet be
known to the general public. At least in the court system, certain procedures
must be followed before documents containing such vital infonnation can be
sealed. I 14 Also, if the need later arises and an adequate showing is made, such
documents can be later unsealed for the public's perusal. 115 Such institutional
protections are completely lacking in the world of private AD.R .. Arthur
Bryant of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice hits the mark on this important point:
l08 See, e.g., Borzou Daragahi, "Environmental ADR" N Y.L.J., (8th September, 1994) at p.5;
Schroder, supra n.53 at C14.
109 See supra n.42 and accompanying text.
110 Robert 1. Kenagy, "Whirlpool's Search for Efficient and Effective Dispute Resolutions"
59 Alb. L. Rev. 895 at p.897 (1995)
III Ibidatp.898.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid. Yet another example is the recent Ford-Firestone Tire and S.U.V. debacle.
114 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (6)-(7) (trade secret material can be sealed "for good
cause" as "justice requires").
115 See Charles A Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2044.1 ("Modification of
Protective Orders")
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"[S]ecrecy subverts democracy itself. .. Every day the papers are
filled with disputes over whether our civil rights, securities,
antitrust, product liability, environmental and other laws need to
be changed. Wouldn't it be great if, in order to decide these and
similar questions, the public, Congress and the president could
actually know the facts?,,116
(b) Widening the Gap Between the "Haves" and "Have-Nots"
In the United States the public supported judicial system has, at least as one of
its announced goals, the desire to bridge gaps in resources between the parties
and ensure that the proceeding is conducted on a level playing field. A good
judge will often look out for the party who may be outmatched by a better-
funded or more talented opponent. If, for example, a young attorney is having
difficulty properly framing an important question to a witness during a trial, it is
not uncommon for an American judge to suggest a more appropriate question to
ask. But with private A.D.R., the participants bargain for and receive something
very different. Third party neutrals do not normally assume such a protective
role, especially if they were selected from an industry panel. 117Many
sophisticated businesses and their corporate counsel know this fact and seek to
use it to their advantage, primarily through mandatory arbitration clauses. I IS
While private A.D.R. is no doubt appropriate for certain disputes, it should not
become a corporate tool for further widening the gap between the "haves" and
"have-nots" in business. I 19
116 Arthur H. Bryant, Letters, A.B.A. J, (June 1998) at p.IO.
117 See Peter F. Blackman, "Arbitration Suit Asserts Constitutional Arguments" Nat 'IL.J.,
(2ih February, 1995) at B I at B2; Richard C. Rueben, "Reforming ADR" Cal. Law.
(February, 1998) at ppJl-33; and Michele Marcucci, "Freeing ADR" Cal. Law. (February,
1998) at p.29 & 70-75.
118 The American securities industry is notorious for doing this. See, e.g., Susan Antilla,
"Brokerage Firms Steer Dissatisfied Customers Away From Court, but in Only One
Direction" NY Times (12th May, 1995) at A29.
119 See Marc Galanter, "Why the "Have's" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change" 9 Law & Soc 'y Rev. 95 (1974) (comparing the structural advantages of
institutional litigants to "one-shot" litigants). Galanter notes that institutional litigants are
typically those organizations that: (1) engage in frequent litigation; (2) are more concerned
with long-range goals than with the outcome of a particular case; and (3) have the political
and economic resources necessary to support their larger interests. Ibid at pp.97-104.
Galanter argues that businesses are the classic "repeat players" in the legal system and as
such, are able to use their experience as "repeat players" to their advantage. Ibid
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(c) A Reduction in the Power and Legitimacy of the Courts
Courts, like any institution, can only function properly if they have the respect
and support of the people. However, as businesses make increasing use of
private A.D.R., only certain types of cases may be left in the court system --
namely, criminal, family law, civil rights, in pro per cases, and the like --
thereby reducing the overall power ofthe courts in our society.l20 Is America
moving toward a society in which the businesses with money make use of
private AD.RI21 while others are consigned to public courts which government
will have little incentive to fund because their constituents lack political clout?
Will American courts suffer the same fate as its public school system?122
Perhaps. Thus, the following admonition by Illinois Supreme Court Justice
Moses Harrison should be kept in mind:
"Generally speaking, I'm opposed to dispute resolution and
mediation. I know that we need some means to dispose of cases,
but I don't believe that sitting around trying to talk things over is
an adequate substitute for formal proceedings governed by rules
of evidence and presided over by an experienced judge. Our
current system is the culmination of centuries of experience,
experience which has shown that without rules of evidence, real
justice is difficult to achieve. [A.D.R] may make ... statistics
look good, but good statistics don't necessarily reflect an
improvement. After all, Mussolini made the trains run on time in
Italy, but so what? He had to tum his country into a fascist state
to do it. Mediation and alternative dispute resolution proposals
are seductive because they promise to reduce costs, but they are
120 See David Luban, "Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm" 83 Geo. L. J. 2619
at p.2625 (1995) ("Whenever disputants rely on the final and public judgement of a court to
resolve their controversy, they enhance the court's claim as an authoritative resolver of
controversies. However, when disputants turn elsewhere for resolution - private arbitration,
nonjudicial government agencies, or private bargaining - the salience of adjudication fades
and the authority of courts weakens. ").
121 See, e.g., Reuben, supra n.42 at p.55 (noting that fees charged by private rent-a-judges
range from $350 to $500 per hour). Presumably, only wealthy businesses and litigants can
afford such rates, thereby creating a two-tier system of justice - one for the "haves" and
another for the "have-nots."
122 See James Podgers, "Chasing the Ideal As More Americans Find Themselves Priced Out
of the System, the Struggle Goes on to Fulfill the Promise of Equal Justice for All" A.B.A. 1.,
(August, 1994) at p.61 (analogizing the harm to public education due to loss of public support
to the potential harm to the public court system if the big players exit the system for private
AD.R.).
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dangerous because they are also a means for reducing the power
of the courts. These proposals are in direct competition with our
court system. Indeed, they threaten to destroy to very system that
is the very basis of our profession. They undermine the judiciary
by diverting scarce resources away from the courts and by
placing the process under the .control of people who do not know
and have no reason to know any law or rules of evidence. The
result, I believe, will be a cut-rate brand of rough justice that is
. h Co' . b I h ,,123nelt er laIr nor conSistent, ut mere y c eap.
VIII. PROCEED WITH CAUTION: ARE ADR AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IMPORTS ENGLAND NEEDS?
The continued vitality and utility of a contemporary body of commercial
common law in the United States and England, based upon many courts'
experiences with similar business cases, and the evolution of a set of principles
to govern business conduct, requires: (1) that there continue to be a substantial
pool of business cases processed and decided by our respective public court
systems; and (2) that the decisions in those cases be available as precedent and
become part of the evolving framework for governing and deciding business
and commercial disputes.
England & Wales appear poised at an important juncture in the effort to
reform the civil justice system and in particular how A.D.R. should be
incorporated in those reforms (if at all). They have been operating under the
Woolf reforms for almost two years now and although by comparison with the
United States the use of A.D.R. in England & Wales is quite limited, proposals
for reform in England & Wales increasingly embrace A.D.R. as potentially
offering solutions to the problems at least of cost and delay. ]24
Based upon the American experience over the past twenty-five years with
civil justice reforms and the authors' own past analyses of reforms which might
be implemented in the United States,125we make the following cautionary
observations about the advisability and efficacy of incorporating A.D.R. and
123 Justice Moses Harrison, 1996 Illinois Supreme Court dinner keynote address, quoted in
Lucille M. Ponte & Thomas D Cavenagh, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Business (West
Educational Pub., 1999) at pp.329-330.
124 See Sally Lloyd-Bostock, "Alternative Dispute Resolution and Civil Justice Reform: Is
ADR Being Used to Paper Over Cracks?" 11 Ohio St. 1. on Disp. Resol. 397 (1996).
125 See. e.g., Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, "A Different Perspective on Privatizing
Business Dispute Resolution" TortSource (American Bar Association) (Fall, 1999), at p.4.
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other privatization devices in an English context. Or, as one U.K. commentator
succinctly framed it, is institutionalized AD.R. "an import we want?,,126
(a) Maintaining a Sufficient Quantity and Variety of Business Cases
If the common law is to continue to evolve contemporary principles for
allocating risk and deciding business and commercial disputes, the court system
must be able to attract and process a large number and variety of business cases.
Only with a sufficient number and variety of cases can the system operate to
fine-tune itself by recognizing patterns of commercial practice and in tum
develop common law responses to recurring problems. 127
The past two decades have witnessed a number of initiatives in the American
court system, a great majority of which single out and attempt to address the
issue of delay, that "justice delayed is Justice denied.,,128 These initiatives have
included the so-called "Rocket Docket" and "Fast Track" programmes, as well
as increased judicial intervention and management of cases. The extent to which
those reforms address and improve the viability and attractiveness of the court
system as a form of choice for business cases in unclear.
The reforms based on Lord Woolfs recommendations which were
implemented and apply to all claims actions begun on or after 26th April, 1999,
appear to focus on streamlining the process for certain categories of cases and
thereby address the issue of delay. 129The Woolf reforms apply to four
protocols: housing disrepair, medical negligence, road traffic accidents, and
personal injury. 130These claims are then fitted into three claim tracks: a small
claims track involving damages less than £5,000 for which costs are restricted
and a hearing will likely not be required; a fast track, with claims valued up to
£15,000; and a multi-track, which involves complex cases with more judicial
management. 131Unlike the American example, the reforms based on Lord
Woolfs recommendations at least at this early stage are focused just on those
four categories of cases. Those categories, particularly the personal injury
126 See Lloyd-Bostock, supra n.124 at p.397.
127 Earlier it was noted that in the United States only a fraction of cases are resolved by trial.
Thus, if we assume that ninety-five percent of all business cases are settled or otherwise
disposed of before trial, and if, of the remaining fivepercent, half (or more) are eliminated
from the precedent setting pool due to selective publication, vacatur, or depublication, then
by the end of the process, very few cases are even left over to grow and develop our
contemporary body of commercial common law in a meaningful way.
128 John K. Van de Kamp & Richard Jacobs, "Reducing Time to Trial: The Trial Court Delay
Reduction Act of 1986" 1Cal. Litig. 9 at p.9 (1987)
129 See Meder & Vickers, supra n.37.
130 Ibid.
1J1 Ibid.
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category covering road accidents, slip and fall, and employer liability cases,
share certain attributes, including relatively high frequency and low severity and
are amenable to fast-track treatment. This is a very different situation from the
way refonns have generally been implemented in the United States, where fast
track and delay reduction rules have been applied generally across the board to
cases of all types, and with the possible exception of small claims matters,
without significant distinction based upon the amount in controversy. 132
I Just Say No to Institutionalized A.D.R.
It is undisputed that private consensual A.D.R., particularly arbitration, while
sometimes faster and arguably cheaper than full-blown judicial proceedings, has
fewer safeguards against error. 133For this fact alone, parties who agree to
binding arbitration or are often deemed to have accepted the increased risk of
error inherent in their chosen system. But for courts to broadly institutionalize
and mandate arbitration, even where not binding and de novo review is possible,
as a pre-condition to having a matter tried in court (as is the most frequent
iteration in American refonns), is fundamentally at odds with the consensual
nature of arbitration and the fact that arbitration is and should remain a matter of
contract. As discussed above, the fact that arbitrators are not public officers and
are in no way publicly accountable, that the proceedings takes place in private,
are subject to no or only minimal appellate review, and generally limit or
prohibit discovery,134 all militate against compelling arbitration. Finally, as
other commentators have noted with respect to the current A.D.R. proposals in
the U.K., it remains to be seen how the introduction of A.D.R. procedures will
actually improve access to justice.
"It will be unfortunate if reducing court delays and costs to the
public purse are viewed as automatically improving access to
justice, and if concerns over cost lead to the introduction of ADR
procedures that worsen problems they are ostensibly intended to
cure.,,135
132 In some states, for example, California, judicially mandated arbitration is limited to cases
where the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and fees, is less than $50,000. See
California Rule of Court 1600.5.
133 See discussion in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal.4th 1 at 7-28; 832 P.2d 899 at 902-
915; 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183 (1992).
134 See Broughton, supra n.34 at 1082: 78.
135 See Lloyd-Bostock, supra n.124 at p.402.
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2. IfInstitutionalized AD.R. is Adopted it Should Be Limited to Appropriate
Cases
In the event that the current enthusiasm for embracing AD.R. and building it
into civil procedure proves unavoidable, it should, for the reasons discussed in
this article including the impact on the development of the common law and its
generally inferior quality of justice, be limited to categories of claims which
demonstrate high frequency, low severity, modest damages, and where time is
of the essence. So limited, AD.R. will at least have a chance to realize some of
its promise of efficiency in modest cases and the fact that the high frequency,
low severity cases are likely to be ones which do not generally involve quickly-
evolving areas of law or business and which might not be expected to be
hotbeds for the evolution of new principles through the mechanisms of common
law courts.
3. Limit Voluntary Arbitration to Protect Legitimate Public Interests and
Avoid Inherent Conflict
In the United States, civil justice reforms have generally resulted in private
consensual arbitration being given virtually a blank check and the courts
bending over backwards to see that such arbitration agreements are not just
observed but indulged. Voluntary arbitrations are of particular interest to the
subject of this article because it can be anticipated that many of them will
represent business disputes. The ability of parties to contractually agree to
arbitrate their disputes should have some reasonable limitations when those
disputes affect the public interest. For example, anti-waiver provisions may be
useful in insuring that statutes meant to protect the public and consumers or
which provide for injunctive relief, are not in a wholesale fashion relegated to
the private, unreviewable, unaccountable universe of arbitration. Interestingly,
in the United States it is only recently that courts have begun understanding that
there may be inherent conflicts between arbitration and the underlying
legislative purposes of certain enforcement and injunctive relief remedies and
that:
"the judicial forum has significant institutional advantages over
arbitration in administering a public injunctive remedy, which as
a consequence will likely lead to the diminution or frustration of
the public benefit ifthe remedy is entrusted to arbitrators.,,136
Another important area where there is a public interest in proscribing private
arbitration is in connection with the scope of judicial review. In the courts'
136 See Broughton, supra n.34 at 1082.
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eagerness to reduce their caseloads and the resulting affection for giving
arbitration the benefit of any doubt, many courts have effectively abdicated any
role in judicial review of arbitration awards, even being willing to confirm
arbitration awards they know to be manifestly wrong and substantially unjust. 137
There is a public interest which should be asserted by the courts that if an
arbitration award on its face is erroneous and on its face results in substantial
injustice, a court asked to confirm the award:
"will not tum a blind eye to the consequences of its action, but
will instead take the only course consistent with its fundamental
mandate, and will vacate the award.,,138
To hold otherwise not only undermines the courts' fundamental objective and
goal which must be justice, but it also effectively would allow the exercise of
judicial power to be controlled or compelled by private agreement or
stipulation, which is equally anathema to a system dedicated to justice.
Accordingly, even on cases which proceed to private arbitration, the court
should insist on a standard of review that will allow the correction of gross error
that results in a substantial injustice.
(b) Insuring the Availability and Use of Decisions
As discussed above, the second thrust of American reforms has been to
encourage procedures which have the result of rendering court decisions useless
as a precedent or principles for reference or guidance in future disputes. These
procedures including vacatur, selective publication, no citation rules and
depublication operate to withdraw from the pool of accumulated wisdom and
experience a body of cases and make them inaccessible for use in evolving the
common law. Furthermore, the very nature of the self-selection process inherent
in most of the procedures and of allowing a court to decide whether a particular
decision or opinion mayor should be used for guidance or precedent in another
time, is inherently tlawed.139 We would urge that English reformers resist the
137 See. e.g., Moncharsh, supra n.l33.
138 Moncharsh, ibid at 832 P.2d at 921.
139 One of the authors previously represented a petitioner before the United States Supreme
Court in which cerliori was granted from a unanimous United States Circuit Court of Appeal
decision against him, and which was also deemed "not for publication." The case before the
Supreme Court, which involved the scope offederal jurisdiction under Section 2 of the
Constitution, was reversed by a unanimous Supreme Court, leaving the decision by the
Circuit Court not to publish its decision, as a curious substantive and procedural anomaly.
Indeed, the author who represented the petitioner in the case, which has since been cited
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temptation to allow workload concerns to justify these peculiar American
inventions which so undermine the presumption of the common law and
privatize the resolution of the dispute. Selective publication, vacatur and
depublication should be barred and rules put in place to permit the citation of
any decision by an appellate court of record. Not only would this be consistent
with the traditional common law model,140 but in this age of computers there
can be no reasonable objection made to the burde'n or expense of making
available all decisions of appellate courts of record.
IX.Conclusion
Civil justice reform initiatives need to be sensitive to the fact that our court
systems have a function and purpose beyond just resolving as quickly as
possible and at the lowest cost the immediate dispute before them. Those of us
who were raised in and who cut our teeth on the common law tradition tend to
take the common law for granted; after all it has survived many challenges over
the past hundreds of years. But we submit that even well-intentioned reforms
attempting to serve the goals of cost savings and reduction in court caseloads,
which have the effect of diverting significant numbers of commercial cases
from the public courts and/or which impair the ability to refer to and use
precedent and past decisional authority in fashioning solutions to new problems
will not only reduce the collective experience and wisdom available and
embodied in the common law but "conflict with other goals not the least of
which is justice.,,141 Such reforms should only be entertained, if at all, upon a
manifest demonstration of necessity and not casually as simply the reform
flavour in vogue this month. As we look to the future of business dispute
resolution in the 21 sl century featuring challenges of e-commerce and increased
globalization, among others, we would do well to respect and safeguard the
genius and vital contribution of the living common law. It is hoped that England
& Wales might avoid and learn from some of the missteps and results of the
United States civil justice reform experience. There are signs, for example in the
relatively limited and defined protocols in the categories of cases affected by the
Woolf reforms, that England & Wales are proceeding more cautiously than we
did and, as a result, that courts in England & Wales remain and are likely to
continue to remain, an important, attractive and efficient institution in
promoting justice in its citizens' business and commercial lives.
hundreds of times, continues to get queries about where other lawyers and scholars can find
the Circuit Court's opinion.
140 See Carpenter, supra n.?3 at p.240.
141 See Lloyd-Bostock, supra n.124 at pAO 1
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Francis Bacon observed that:
"[h]ad it not been for Sir Edward Coke's Reports ... the law by
this time had been almost like a ship without ballast, for that the
cases of modem experience are fled from those that are adjudged
and ruled in former time. ,,142
To provide that ballast and continuity without stasis is the unique gift of the
common law. As Australia's High Court Justice, Michael Kirby, has explained:
"the element of creativity, properly harnessed and well directed,
is not a weakness of the common law system. It is a mighty
strength. It helps to explain the survival of the common law as
one of the greatest of the legacies of the British Empire. It helps
to avoid stamping, unquestioned, on one generation, the
morality, attitudes and social rules of the distant past." 143
142 Francis Bacon, quoted in Bowen, supra n.2 at p.507.
143 The Han. Justice Michael Kirby, supra n.8 at p.145.
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